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A HISTORY OF THE WISCONSIN
INHERITANCE TAX
JACK STARK*
I. INTRODUCTION
Wisconsin's inheritance tax, which was repealed in 1987, never
generated a large portion of the state's revenue; however, the potential
and actual inheritance tax liabilities of some wealthy and influential
persons created contention and political significance. Moreover, the
nature of the tax-it was a tax on the transfer of property upon
death-and certain attributes of the tax readily provoked ideological
arguments. In fact, the inception of the tax, some of its modifications,
and its discontinuation reflect important changes in Wisconsin's political
climate. Furthermore, the tax was frequently litigated. Many of the
cases involved only marginally important issues, but some of them
forced, or allowed, judges to deal with a few of the weighty issues that
confronted legislators. For these reasons, the importance of the
inheritance tax in Wisconsin's political and legal history greatly
outweighs the tax's fiscal significance.
II. THE INCEPTION OF AN EXACTION
At first, Wisconsin had a few rudimentary death taxes and facsimiles
thereof. In 1868, the Wisconsin Legislature enacted the state's first
exaction, activated by the transfer of property upon death.' The
exaction was imposed upon estates, and thus was not an inheritance tax,
if it was a tax at all. It was a source of funding for courts and was
imposed on persons in all counties who used the courts, so it can
plausibly be classified as a user fee. Although the law was the beginning
of what would later develop into a codified inheritance tax, it lasted only
four years, and the legislature repealed it in 1872.2 Five years later, in
1877, the legislature enacted a law that was similar to the repealed law,
* B.A. 1961, Northland College; M.A. 1963, Claremont; Ph.D. 1969, University of
Wisconsin; J.D. 1979, University of Wisconsin.
1. Act of Mar. 13, 1868, ch. 12, § 4, 1868 Wis. Laws 123, 123-24.
2. Act of Apr. 4, 1872, ch. 40, 1872 Wis. Laws 47.
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except that it explicitly applied in only Milwaukee County That law
imposed an exaction, according to a graduated scale, on estates and the
property of wards that guardians administered. The law appeared in
that form in the 1878 Revised Statutes.4
In 1889, the legislature repealed the death tax law of 1887 and
created a different exaction At first glance, this law was more general
than the 1887 law because it applied to any counties that had a
population of more than 150,000;6 however, in application, the law was
just as narrow because at that time, only Milwaukee County had that
many residents. The 1889 law imposed an exaction of 0.5% on the first
$500,000 of each estate or ward's property that a guardian administered,
and an additional 0.1% on the value above $500,000.' Estates and the
property of wards were exempt if they were worth less than $3000.8 The
exaction was to be paid to the county treasurer and was intended to
fund "the expense of administration and guardianship." 9 That exaction
is called a "sum" or an "amount" and is said to be "in lieu of fees, '1
which apparently referred to usual court fees, such as filing fees. The
low rate, the recipient of the revenue, and the mandated use of the
revenue suggest that the exaction might more accurately be called a fee.
Conversely, the absence of an upper limit makes the exaction seem like
a tax. That is, the cost of administration almost certainly did not
continue to increase as the size of an estate increased, and the exaction
therefore produced general revenue above and beyond compensation
for court fees. For example, whereas the 1868 law imposed a charge of
$75 on all estates of $10,000 or more," the 1889 law imposed a
considerably higher charge against very large estates. 2 Thus, the 1889
law not only funded the administration of estates but also redistributed
income.
Other noticeable differences between prior laws and the 1889 law
introduced an element of ideology into the history of Wisconsin death
taxes. That additional function raised the issue of the propriety of using
3. Act of Mar. 6, 1877, ch. 98, § 4, 1877 Wis. Laws 190, 191.
4. 1878 Revised Statutes.
5. Act of Mar. 28, 1889, ch. 176, 1889 Wis. Laws 182.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Act of Mar. 13, 1868, ch. 121, § 4,1868 Wis. Laws 123.
12. Act of Mar. 28, 1889, ch. 176, 1889 Wis. Laws 182.
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death taxes, or exactions that resembled them, to limit the amount of
property that a decedent could transfer. The debate about whether this
country should have an aristocracy of birth, which the absence of death
taxes facilitates, or an aristocracy of talent, which the presence of death
taxes facilitates, had once again arisen.
A. Constitutional Challenges to the "Exaction": Fee or Tax?
While the earlier laws had gone unchallenged in court-most likely a
result of their low upper limits-the 1889 law did not escape
adjudicative scrutiny and was quickly challenged in 1890.3 The estate in
the case was appraised at $631,949.08 and owed $2631.95 in taxes;
14
under the 1868 law it would have owed only $75. The crucial issue in the
case was whether the exaction was a fee or a tax.15 The court held that it
was the latter, and as a result, subjected it to three constitutional
provisions. 6
One of those provisions required that "'the rule of taxation shall be
uniform.' 17  Another section of the constitution prohibited the
enactment of special or private laws for the assessment of taxes, 8 and a
third section stated that only general laws that applied uniformly
throughout the state could be enacted." Thus, only general laws that
applied uniformly throughout the state could be enacted for the
assessment of taxes.
The court held that because the tax law was limited in operation to
Milwaukee County, it was a special law that did not operate uniformly
throughout the state and was therefore unconstitutional. 20 However, a
later court held that the section of the constitution dealing with
uniformity of taxes did not apply to death taxes.2' Although a dissenting
judge in Sanderson argued that the exaction was a fee,22 the majority's
position that it was a tax makes sense, and its conclusion that the act
creating the tax was a special law-that is, one with a limited
application-is also convincing. Because the case turned on the
13. State ex rel. Sanderson v. Mann, 76 Wis. 469, 45 N.W. 526 (1890).
14. Id. at 470-71, 45 N.W. at 526-27.
15. Id. at 474-75, 45 N.W. at 528.
16. Id. at 475-77, 45 N.W. at 528-29.
17. Id. at 476, 45 N.W. at 529 (citing WIs. CONST. art VIII, § 1).
18. WIs. CONST. art. IV, § 31.
19. Id. § 32.
20. Sanderson, 76 Wis. at 480, 45 N.W. at 530.
21. See Nunnemacher v. State, 129 Wis. 190, 108 N.W. 627 (1906).
22. Sanderson, 76 Wis. at 480, 45 N.W. at 482.
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uniformity of the rule, the court had to decide only peripheral issues, not
difficult and politically charged issues.
B. Policy Issues Influencing the Inheritance Tax
Some of the major public policy issues related to the inheritance tax
emerged soon after Sanderson. The occasion was the 1898 report of the
Wisconsin State Tax Commission ("Commission"), 3 a state agency that
then consisted of the governor, the secretary of state, and three
nonelected officials." One of the Commission's duties was to advise the
legislature on tax policy. 25 At that time, the property tax was not only
the major source of revenue for local units of government, but it was
also an important state tax. The Commission noted that property tax
assessors failed to find a good deal of personal property, especially
intangible personal property. 6 That fact induced the Commission to
write:
We recommend an inheritance tax as a partial substitute [for the
property tax] which, as a tax burden, would rest, without shifting,
upon intangible property not reached under present methods
more than upon any other property. It would thus supplement
the present system in the very feature wherein it is most
inefficient.27
The Commission realized that it was much easier to discover, and
thus to tax, intangible property during the probate process, when it was
subject to an inventory, than during the owner's lifetime.28 The
Commission recognized that it was impractical to tax credits (the rights
of lenders to collect loan payments) and saw the inheritance tax as a
possible solution.29 For example, a person who was still making
payments on a home was taxed on the entire value of the home,
although part of that value reflected the lender's right to loan payments,
which was secured by a mortgage that, upon default, ultimately allowed
the lender to seize the home. The administrative burdens of identifying
23. WISCONSIN STATE TAX COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE WISCONSIN STATE TAX
COMMISSION (1898) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT 1898].
24. Act of May 1, 1897, ch. 340, §§ 1, 5, 1897 Wis. Laws 765-66.
25. Id. § 3.
26. COMMISSION REPORT 1898, supra note 23, at 120.
27. Id. at 121.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 160.
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the lender and allocating the value of the home between the owner and
the lender, as well as the likelihood that lenders would pass on the tax to
consumers in the form of higher interest rates, made taxing that credit
impractical and unwise.30 As a result, the Commission recommended
that the state stop taxing credits and suggested instead that an
inheritance tax would help solve the problem.31 The Commission's
stated motive was to make the state's tax system more equitable, not to
disadvantage wealthy persons by redistributing income.32 Although the
value of intangible property that wealthy persons owned far exceeded
the value of other persons' intangible property, there is no reason to
doubt the Commission's sincerity.
III. IMPLEMENTING THE INHERITANCE TAX: A SERIES OF TRIALS
The Commission's advocacy of an inheritance tax apparently
convinced the legislature, which promptly enacted a law that imposed a
tax on the transfer of property at death.33 That tax was levied on only
personal property," which suggests that the legislature accepted the
Commission's rationale for the tax. The law was inartfully drafted; it did
not clearly identify the person who was required to pay the tax.35 The
tax was imposed on the transfer, not on the receipt of property.36
However, because the tax is called an inheritance tax in the bill's title,37
the tax was probably intended to be imposed on the transferee. The
first $10,000 of the value of property transferred was exempt, and the
remainder was taxed at 5%,8 except that if the transfer was to a father,
mother, husband, wife, child, brother, sister, wife or widow of a son,
husband of a daughter, or adopted child, the rate was 1%." The flat rate
also indicates that the legislature's motive was not to impose a greater
tax burden on wealthy persons.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 161.
32. See id. at 161-63.
33. Act of May 12, 1899, ch. 355, 1899 Wis. Laws 668.
34. Id. § 1, 1899 Wis. Laws 668.
35. Id. § 3, 1899 Wis. Laws 668.
36. Id. § 3, 1899 Wis. Laws 668, 670.
37. Act of May 12, 1899, ch. 355, 1899 Wis. Laws 668.
38. Id. § 1, 1899 Wis. Laws 668-69.
39. Id. § 2, 1899 Wis. Laws 669.
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A. Political Influence on the Inheritance Tax
Between the issuance of the first and second reports, the world of
Wisconsin politics had changed, which was reflected in the make-up of a
new Tax Commission. At the time that it issued its second report,"° the
Commission no longer had any elected officials as members, and two of
the three nonelected officials who were on the Commission in 1898 had
been replaced. In 1901, Robert M. La Follette, Sr., was elected as
Wisconsin's governor, a major political event. In the wake of the
election, La Follette, the first in a series of three Progressive governors,
appointed Nels Haugen, one of his closest allies at the time, to the Tax
Commission.4
It is widely believed that a major motive of the Progressives was to
fiscally punish the wealthy. For example, two historians have attributed
the Progressives' establishment of the income tax a few years later to
that motive." However, careful analysis of the legislative history of the
Income Tax Act, of the voting on that measure, and of the Act's results
indicate that the legislature's primary motive was to make Wisconsin's
system of taxation more equitable.43 Indeed, one of the motives of the
Income Tax Act's advocates was the same as a major motive for
establishing the inheritance tax: to compensate for the difficulty of
subjecting intangible personal property to the property tax."
Despite the primarily Progressive attitudes of its members, the Tax
Commission carried on a quiet battle of making the administration of
tax more equitable. The Progressives' motives for taxation are
illustrated by the fact that the Commission's 1901 report is heavy on
technical analysis and light on political rhetoric.4 ' For example, in its
1898 report, the Commission based its assertions on impressions that
most intangible personal property escaped taxation.' In contrast, in its
40. WISCONSIN STATE TAX COMMISSION, FIRST BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE
WISCONSIN STATE TAX COMMISSION TO THE LEGISLATURE (1901) [hereinafter
COMMISSION REPORT 19011.
41. Like many of La Follette's allies, he eventually fell out of favor with his chief.
42. See DAVID P. THELEN, THE NEW CITIZENSHIP (1972); W. Elliott Brownlee Jr.,
Income Taxation and the Political Economy of Wisconsin, 1890-1930, WIS. MAG. HIST.,
Summer 1976, at 299.
43. See generally John 0. Stark, The Establishment of Wisconsin's Income Tax, WIS.
MAG. HIST., Autumn 1987, at 27, 41.
44. Id.
45. COMMISSION REPORT 1901, supra note 40.
46. COMMISSION REPORT 1898, supra note 23, at 120.
[88:947
WISCONSIN INHERITANCE TAX
1901 report, rather than expound on its political theories, the
Progressive-heavy Commission made its case for imposing an
inheritance tax in part by announcing the results of a comparison of
assessment records and probate records in seven counties.47 The latter
records were far more likely to be accurate because inventories of
estates were complete or virtually complete and because expert
appraisers determined the value of property in estates. The
Commission found that the taxable personal property of decedents
whose estates had been probated had been assessed at only 14% of their
48
actual value, as determined by appraisals for probate purposes.
Inaccuracy and omissions in assessments were even more pronounced
with regard to intangible personal property, of which only 5.5% had
been assessed.49 Thus, the Commission provided ample evidence for its
conclusions regarding taxation and seemed justified in pressuring local
officials to improve the process.
The Commission gingerly approached the issues of public policy that
were related to its findings on the escape of personal property from
taxation. On "the taxation of moneys, and credits, especially bank
deposits and real estate mortgages," it opined:
[T]he consideration of these questions opens up a field of
discussion so wide that we can no more than allude to the topic
at this time; and until it can be given full and exhaustive
consideration it is perhaps best that no attempt be made to reach
or state definite conclusions.'
The Commission, however, did anticipate that in the near future there
would be agreement "that so much revenue as ought to accrue to the
public under a wise policy from such forms of property shall be secured
by indirect methods more nearly approximating equality between
individual citizens. The taxation of inheritances of personal property is
a step in that direction."5' Thus, the Progressives' policies on the
taxation of intangible personal property were again based on concerns
about equity, not on desires to redistribute income.
47. COMMISSION REPORT 1901, supra note 40, at 128-31.
48. Id. at 129-30.
49. Id. at 131.
50. Id. at 142.
51. Id. at 143.
2005]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
B. Constitutional Challenges to the Inheritance Tax: Equal Protection
Although the Commission supported the 1899 inheritance tax law,
that law had a short life. Like the 1889 inheritance tax law, the 1899 law
was held unconstitutional.52 The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Black v.
State,53 wrote that it considered unimportant the question of whether the
tax violated the state constitution's Uniformity Clause," despite the
plaintiff's argument to the contrary. Instead, the court examined the tax
in the context of the state constitution's version of the federal Equal
Protection Clause.55 The court held that the tax violated the Equal
Protection Clause because transfers of property of equal value to the
same class of legatees would result in tax liability for some legatees if
the entire estate's value exceeded the amount of the exemption, while
other legatees could escape tax liability simply because the entire
estate's value from which their transfer came was equal to or less than
the exemption.56 Like the statute that was at issue in Sanderson,"1 the
statute that was at issue in Black was clearly unconstitutional due to
some of its details; therefore, as in Sanderson, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court could decide easily the case while avoiding the important public
policy issues that lurked beneath the tax's surface.
1. An Inherent Right to Inherit?
In Black, the first instance of a political argument-as opposed to
advocacy supporting taxation regardless of whom it helped or
hurt-appeared. The writer of the majority opinion, Justice Winslow,
noted in passing that if the right to transfer property at death was not
inherent, those transfers could be taxed at 100%, and the right would
thereby be nullified.58 In a concurring opinion, Justice Marshall wrote
that he wished that the majority opinion had not passed so lightly over
the issue.59 The right to inherit, Marshall wrote, is inherent and is
subject to only a few limitations, including nondiscriminatory taxation6
Marshall, who was not known for lassitude, then proceeded, at
52. See Black v. State, 113 Wis. 205, 222, 89 N.W. 522, 528 (1902).
53. Id. at 205, 89 N.W. at 522.
54. Id. at 218, 89 N.W. at 526 (referring to Wis. CONST. art. VIII, § 1).
55. Id. at 219-22, 89 N.W. at 527-28 (referring to WIS. CONST. art. I, § 1).
56. Id. at 222, 89 N.W. at 528.
57. State ex. rel Sanderson v. Mann, 76 Wis. 469, 45 N.W. 526 (1890).
58. Black v. State, 113 Wis. 205, 215, 89 N.W. 522, 526 (1902).
59. Id. at 223-24, 89 N.W. at 529 (Marshall, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 232-33, 89 N.W. at 531-32 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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considerable length, to defend property rights.6
2. Changes in the Political View of the Court
Justice Marshall did not state the motive for his digression, but the
timing of it is revealing. Shortly before the opinion was issued, Robert
M. La Follette was elected to his first term as governor of Wisconsin. La
Follette's rhetorically powerful attacks on special interests were well
known, and they suggested to many people that property rights,
especially those asserted by the wealthy, were not as secure as they had
been before his inauguration. Marshall was a conservative jurist.62 In
fact, before he began his long tenure on the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
he had been counsel for major lumber interests.63 In his concurrence, he
appears to be announcing, in veiled terms, that he would defend
property interests against attacks that he expected La Follette and his
allies to mount on them. However, if that was the case, Marshall's
apprehension was ill-founded. As we have seen, the Progressives' tax
policy was based on a respect for equity, not on a desire to confiscate
wealth.
Regardless of the accuracy of Marshall's perceptions about the
Progressives, the relationship between the court and the loci of power in
the state government had changed. At this point, it is important to
clarify this new relationship, because soon after the court decided Black,
it decided a case in which it had to squarely face the question of whether
an inheritance tax law that was not obviously flawed, as were the ones at
issue in Sanderson and Black, was constitutional.
The Progressive era in Wisconsin lasted from 1901 to 1915.64 In 1901,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court had five members. Due to a
constitutional amendment, its membership was increased to six in 1905
and to the present seven in 1908.65 From 1901 to 1915, the Progressive
governors appointed only two justices: Bashford, who served for less
than one year, and Vinje, who was not appointed until 1910. During
that period, the only other obvious Progressive was Justice Siebecker
(who was in fact Robert M. La Follette's brother-in-law). Marshall and
Winslow, two conservatives, served for the entire Progressive era. Thus,
61. Id. at 223-33, 89 N.W. at 529-32 (Marshall, J., concurring).
62. See generally, 1 ROUJET D. MARSHALL, AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF ROUJET D.
MARSHALL (Gilson G. Glasier ed., 1923).
63. Id. at 272-344.
64. Robert M. La Follette's son Philip was governor for three nonconsecutive terms in
the 1930s, and his tenure was an attenuated second Progressive era.
65. 1877 Senate Joint Resolution 2, ch. 48, Laws of 1877.
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the court was certainly not well disposed toward the Progressives.
Despite the court's composition, it upheld most of the major Progressive
legislation that was challenged. For example, the court upheld the
Progressives' innovative legislation on workers' compensation," the
income tax,67 the Civil Service Commission,' workplace safety and the
Industrial Commission,' and the direct primary.' Two exceptions were
challenges to acts on water conservation and regulation.7' The only
other major exception is a case in which the court, with Justice Marshall
writing the majority opinion, invalidated a forestry program on the
grounds that the constitutional amendment that made it possible was
procedurally defective. 72 After so holding, Marshall went on at great
length to invalidate the program on as many other grounds as he could
imagine, some of them being quite fanciful.73
C. The Reaffirmation of Policy: An "Equitable" Inheritance Tax
Despite two legal setbacks, advocacy for instituting an inheritance
tax did not cease. In its 1903 report, the Commission again urged the
enactment of such a tax.74  That report makes clear that the
Commission's primary motive for its recommendation was to make
Wisconsin's tax system more equitable:
The old order of things in taxation must inevitably change and
yield to the new to keep pace with the rapid social and industrial
advances in order to produce equality and justice by the taxation
of every individual according to his ability to 7pay, whether
measured by property, earnings or other standards.
The changes that the report referred to included the decrease in the
relative importance of the economy's agricultural sector. The property
66. Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 133 N.W. 209 (1911).
67. Income Tax Cases, 148 Wis. 456, 134 N.W. 673 (1912).
68. State ex reL. Buell v. Frear, 146 Wis. 291,131 N.W. 832 (1911).
69. State v. Lange Canning Co., 164 Wis. 228, 157 N.W. 777 (1916).
70. State ex rel. Van Alstine v. Frear, 142 Wis. 320, 125 N.W. 961 (1910).
71. State ex reL Jones v. Froehlich, 115 Wis. 32, 91 N.W. 115 (1902); Water Power Cases,
148 Wis. 124, 134 N.W. 330 (1912).
72. State ex reL. Owen v. Donald, 160 Wis. 21, 151 N.W. 331 (1915).
73. See id.
74. WISCONSIN STATE TAX COMMISSION, SECOND BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE
WISCONSIN STATE TAX COMMISSION TO THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE (1903).
75. Id. at 50.
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tax could be much more fairly administered in a primarily agricultural
economy than it could in a mixed economy, which was developing in
Wisconsin. In the former kind of economy, property was clearly visible;
in the latter kind of economy, much of the property was intangible and
thus anything but clearly visible.
The Commission also considered several arguments in favor of, and
several opposed to, inheritance taxes. 6 It rejected the argument that the
tax should be instituted in order to redistribute wealth,77 which again
indicates that the Progressives' tax policy was not based on a desire to
confiscate wealth from those who had a large measure of it. Although
the Commission acknowledged that the most popular justification for
the tax was that it reached property that, due to ineffective
administration, the property tax had not reached, it pointed out that
persons who inherited property-not persons who had avoided taxes on
it-paid the inheritance tax.78 In addition, the Commission rejected the
argument that imposition of an inheritance tax would drive capital from
the state.7 9 That argument was the major one used decades later by
persons who advocated discontinuing the tax. Rather, the Commission
was persuaded that it was rational to impose the tax because it attached
to property that the taxpayer acquired without effort.0  The
Commission also included in its report a copy of a legislative bill it had
prepared that would establish an inheritance tax." In his State of the
State address, Governor La Follette remarked:
[T]he tax inheritance [sic] bill to be prepared and submitted by
the commission doubtless will meet every objection raised by the
supreme court in Black v. State." The wisdom of this legislation
is no longer open to question, and the bill will, I cannot doubt,
receive prompt and favorable consideration at your hands.83
76. Id. at 59-65.
77. Id. at 60.
78. Id. at 61.
79. Id. at 63.
80. Id. at 61-63.
81. Id. at 71-76.
82. 113 Wis. 205, 89 N.W. 522 (1902).
83. JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SIXTH SESSION OF THE WISCONSIN
LEGISLATURE 1903, at 30-31 (1903) [hereinafter JOURNAL]
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D. A "Progressive Rate" Inheritance Tax System
La Follette's prediction was accurate; by the end of March 1903, the
legislature had enacted an inheritance tax law, and La Follette had
signed it.' That law taxed the transfer of both real property and
personal property.85 It had an intricate system of rates that varied both
with the closeness of the transferee's relation to the transferor and with
the amount of property transferred.86 As was true of the 1899 tax, the
law did not clearly identify the payer of the tax, but the tax was labeled
an inheritance tax, so the transferee apparently was required to pay it.
The exemptions were stated in terms of the value of property
transferred to each recipient, not in terms of the overall estate's value.
87
That change from the previous inheritance tax act was a response to
Black. The 1903 act also established a sophisticated administrative
structure.88 Legally, conceptually, and administratively, the 1903 act was
considerably stronger than earlier Wisconsin inheritance tax laws.
1. Constitutional Attacks: Natural Rights, Uniformity, and Equal
Protection
The technical improvements added in the 1903 inheritance tax law
allowed the act to survive a legal challenge.89 The plaintiff in that case
presented three arguments against the law, the first of which was that
the transfer of property at death was a natural right.' On that point, the
plaintiff probably took a clue from Justice Marshall's concurring opinion
in Black. The court, with Justice Winslow writing the majority opinion
as he had in Black, assented to that argument.9 Justice Winslow
acknowledged that on the issue of natural rights, the great weight of
opinion favored the other side, but he framed an argument based on a
Lockean conception of the establishment of civil societies: "The people,
in full possession of liberty and property, come together and create a
government to protect themselves, their liberty, and their property. The
government which they create becomes their agent; the officers their
84. Act of Mar. 31, 1903, ch. 44, 1903 Wis. Laws 65.
85. Id. § 1, 1903 Wis. Laws 65.
86. Id. §§ 2, 3, 1903 Wis. Laws 65, 66-68.
87. Id. § 4, 1903 Wis. Laws 65, 68-69.
88. JOURNAL, supra note 83.
89. Nunnemacher v. State, 129 Wis. 190, 108 N.W. 627 (1906).
90. Id. at 197-98, 108 N.W. at 628.
91. Id. at 198-204, 108 N.W. at 628-30.
[88:947
WISCONSIN INHERITANCE TAX
servants."92 That, of course, is not a legal argument, nor is Winslow's
argument based on the reference to "pursuit of happiness" in the
Declaration of Independence. Winslow revealed the probable actual
motive for his decision by making a third nonlegal argument:
[T]his idea of the acquisition and undisturbed possession of
private property has been the controlling idea of the race, the
supposed goal of earthly happiness. From this idea has sprung
every industry, to preserve it governments have been formed,
and its develogment has been coincident with the development
of civilization.
Winslow, as Marshall had in his concurring opinion in Black,
appeared to have been warning the Progressives that the court would
negate overly zealous attacks on private property, on the wealthy.
Winslow, although a conservative, was more flexible and less dogmatic
than Marshall.94
Despite Winslow's lecture on political theory, the court held that
reasonable taxation did not impair substantially the natural right to
transfer property.95 At that point, the inheritance tax was past the shoals
and sailing smoothly. To counter the plaintiff's argument that the
statement in the constitution that "[t]he rule of taxation shall be
uniform, and taxes shall be levied upon such property as the legislature
shall prescribe ' '96 meant that the state may levy only the property tax,
Winslow cited debates on that section from the constitutional
convention and cases in which other kinds of taxes were approved. 97 On
the plaintiff's third argument, the court held that the requirement of
uniformity established by that constitutional provision, as well as the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and its Wisconsin equivalent,98 required adherence
to only "the true principles of classification."'  According to Winslow,
92. Id. at 199, 108 N.W. at 629.
93. Id. at 201, 108 N.W. at 629.
94. See generally, JOSEPH A. RANNEY, TRUSTING NOTHING TO PROVIDENCE: A
HISTORY OF WISCONSIN'S LEGAL SYSTEM (Roger P. Bruesewitz ed., 1999) (discussing
Justice Winslow).
95. Nunnemacher, 129 Wis. at 203, 108 N.W. at 630.
96. Id. at 204, 108 N.W. at 630 (quoting WIS. CONST. art. VIII, § 1).
97. See id. at 204-21, 108 N.W. at 630-37.
98. Wis. CONST., art. I, § 1.
99. Nunnemacher, 129 Wis. at 221,108 N.W. at 637.
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the progressive rate structure of the tax was a proper classification; the
tax, therefore, was constitutional. °°
The concurring opinion and the two dissenting opinions in
Nunnemacher indicate the political coloring of the court. °' In his
concurring opinion, Justice Marshall wrote ecstatically about the court's
strong stand in favor of property rights, which he had expressed a
yearning for in his concurring opinion in Black. In a revealing passage,
he wrote:
It should be cause for much gratification to all who appreciate
the principles of constitutional liberty, now so signally vindicated,
that, rising above the influence of mere precedent, the court has
the courage to cut loose from a judicial error that has been
almost universally proclaimed by the courts of this country for
many years.
Justice Dodge wrote in dissent that the progressive rate structure
violated both the uniformity clause and the guarantee of equality in the
state constitution. 3 Justice Cassoday, who had written the opinion in
Sanderson,'04 wrote in dissent that the tax was upon property and was
therefore required to be uniform but was not uniform because
classification based on value (the progressive rate structure) was "purely
arbitrary and highly destructive of the equal rights guaranteed by the
constitution. '"1'5 Thus, a court composed of five conservatives and one
progressive upheld a tax that redistributed wealth, although the motive
for enacting it was something else.
2. Political Reaction
Justice Marshall probably hoped that the "judicial error" of denying
an inherent right to transfer property had been permanently corrected.
Reaction to the case, however, indicated otherwise. The author of an
article in a legal encyclopedia wrote:
Not a single other authority can be found to support [the
100. Id. at 222-23, 108 N.W. at 637.
101. Only Justice Siebecker and Justice Kerwin, both of whom voted for the state's
position, did not write an opinion.
102. Nunnemacher, 129 Wis. at 224, 108 N.W. at 638 (Marshall, J., concurring).
103. Id. at 228-33, 108 N.W. at 639-41 (Dodge, J., dissenting).
104. State ex reL Sanderson v. Mann, 76 Wis. 469, 45 N.W. 526 (1890).
105. Nunnemacher, 129 Wis. at 234,108 N.W. at 641 (Cassoday, J., dissenting).
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inherent right doctrine], and it is opposed to the views of all
historians of the law and of all economic writers. Indeed the
entire body of the law of descent and distribution seems to have
been built upon the opposite conclusion.'O'
Nor did the Progressives, either in Wisconsin or on the national
scene, change their position because of Winslow's arguments for
property rights. A few years after Nunnemacher was decided, Theodore
Roosevelt referred to "swollen fortunes,"107 indicating that he did not
include the right to unimpaired accumulation of wealth among valid
property rights. In contrast, Richard Ely, a professor at the University
of Wisconsin whose reputation as a Progressive is not particularly well
founded, dodged the issue by stating that his research on related
subjects was at the time too jejune for him to comment upon
Roosevelt's colorful phrase. °8
Given that an inheritance tax was enacted and declared
constitutional, the Commission did not have to argue in its next report
that such a tax should be enacted or present a draft of such a law. '°9
Rather, the Commission could indulge itself in some well deserved
pride, quoting a commentator who wrote that "'[s]ubsequent to 1900
our interest centres [sic] chiefly in the Wisconsin tax of 1903, which far
surpasses any earlier law in the scientific character of its provisions.""'
0
The Commission also reported that the tax generated roughly $103,000
during the first full fiscal year of its existence, and roughly $125,000 in
the following six months."'
In addition, the Commission expressed its hope that the federal
government would continue to impose an inheritance tax only in times
of war, when additional tax sources were required, thereby leaving the
majority of income derived from routine inheritance tax to the states'' 2
The report included a memorial to Congress from the Wisconsin
Legislature that expressed agreement with the Commission and
requested that Congress repeal the inheritance tax it had imposed to
106. John R. Montgomery, The Inheritance Tax and the Constitution, 10 ILL. L. REV.
633,637 (1916) (quoting 9 L.R.A. (n.s.) 121).
107. 41 CONG. REC. 22, 28 (1906).
108. Richard Ely Discusses Taxes on Inheritance, MADISON DEMOCRAT, Dec. 29, 1906.
109. WISCONSIN STATE TAX COMMISSION, THIRD BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE
WISCONSIN STATE TAX COMMISSION (1907).
110. Id. (quoting Solomon Huebner, The Inheritance Tax in the American
Commonwealths, 18 Q. J. ECON. 529, 542 (1904)).
111. Id.
112. Id.
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help fund the Spanish-American War."3  This tension between the
federal government and state governments over which should have
access to the inheritance tax continued for some time.
3. A Second Round of Constitutional Attack: Natural Rights Revisited
Although Nunnemacher appeared to be a definitive ruling that the
inheritance tax was constitutional, litigation on the subject followed in
its wake. In a 1909 case, the plaintiff launched two assaults on the tax.1
14
The first was based on a drafting error. A literal reading of part of the
1903 law would have resulted in an unreasonable, and therefore
unconstitutional, classification, but the court, with a little straining,
managed an interpretation that saved the tax."5 The second assault was
more clever and more dangerous. The plaintiff argued that if
inheritance was a natural right, as the court had held in Nunnemacher, it
was a property right; thus, the inheritance tax was a property tax, and it
was nonuniform and therefore unconstitutional."6 That argument gave
the court a plausible way to find the tax unconstitutional, but it declined
the gambit. Justice Winslow, writing yet another majority opinion in an
inheritance tax case, pointed out that a number of taxes were imposed
on activities that were natural rights, without being unconstitutional. 17
Justice Timlin, who had joined the court in 1907, demonstrated that his
view of the inheritance tax resembled those expressed earlier by Justices
Cassoday and Dodge. Justice Timlin wrote, in dissent, that despite the
holding to the contrary in Nunnemacher, which he did not mention
(although he did cite Magna Carta), the tax was required to be uniform
but was not." 8
E. Reducing the Impact of the Inheritance Tax:
Judicial and Legislative Influence
As a result of the supreme court's holding in Nunnemacher and
Beals, the inheritance tax's constitutionality was firmly established;
therefore, its opponents turned their attention to weakening its effects.
An example is a case involving the $4 million estate of Frederick Pabst,
113. Id.
114. Beals v. State, 139 Wis. 544, 121 N.W. 347 (1909).
115. Id. at 553-55, 121 N.W. at 348-49.
116. Id. at 555-56, 121 N.W. at 349.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 560-61, 121 N.W. at 350-51 (Timlin, J., dissenting).
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the Milwaukee brewing tycoon."' The Milwaukee Probate Court found
that his heirs' tax liability was approximately $140,000.120 After
proceedings in a circuit court, those heirs paid $113,414.86."' The
plaintiff argued that the tax was invalid for the following reasons:
[I]t attempts to impose a tax on transfers limited to vest on
contingencies which may never happen or to persons not in being
or ascertainable, in making the tax due and payable forthwith out
of the property transferred, by compelling parties to pay such tax
on defeasible estates which they may never own, and in
contemplating the payment of penalties before any opportunity
is afforded to pay the tax. 2
Had the court accepted any of those arguments, artful drafting of wills
would have made tax avoidance possible, but none of them swayed the
court. Careful consideration of the tax's administrative structure made
it easier for the court to reach that result.
A few decades later, the legislature, not the courts, began to
attenuate the inheritance tax. By 1929, the zenith of the Wisconsin
Progressives had passed.12 3 In that year, the legislature enacted a law
that granted an exemption from the inheritance tax for nonresidents'
personal property, except for intangible personal property that had a
situs in Wisconsin, if the state of the decedent's residence granted a
similar exemption.'24  Passage had been difficult. Its opponents
filibustered, and the senate refused to return the bill to the assembly, an
action that was usually considered a courtesy.
At the bill signing, Governor Kohler, a conservative Republican,
asserted that the act "promises to stimulate the investment of capital in
Wisconsin, and thereby increase our sources of taxation.' ' 25  Kohler's
statement indicates the reason for the furor in the legislature. The
motive for the change was not to achieve equity but to benefit the
wealthy: The exemption would apply to intangible property, such as
119. State v. Pabst, 139 Wis. 561, 121 N.W. 351 (1909).
120. Pabst Heirs Must Pay $140,000 Tax, MILW. SENTINEL, June 13, 1908, at 1.
121. Inheritance Tax Law Is Attacked, MADISON DEMOCRAT, Dec. 3, 1908.
122. Pabst, 139 Wis. at 583-84, 121 N.W. at 357.
123. The zenith was the 1911 legislature, which passed much of the innovative legislation
for which the state is still known.
124. Act of July 18, 1929, ch. 298, 1929 Wis. Laws 374.
125. Harold M. Griffin, Sees Benefit to Business in Measure, WIS. ST. J., July 17, 1929, at
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stocks and bank accounts, which were held predominantly by the
wealthy. The argument that a unit of government can increase tax
revenue by decreasing tax revenue would become familiar fifty years
later. The tide had turned. At its inception, the inheritance tax was
considered to be an essential part of an equitable tax system. By 1929,
opponents of the tax occasionally were able to argue successfully that it
impeded economic growth, thereby convincing politicians to provide tax
relief to the wealthy.
In 1939, during the governorship of Julius Heil, the legislature
enacted three laws that further eroded the inheritance tax. One
increased the exemption for decedents' siblings; 2 6 another allowed a
deduction for federal death taxes paid;'27 and a third allowed an
exemption for certain life insurance proceeds."' Even if none of those
acts was specifically designed to help the rich, the rich would receive a
disproportionate share of the benefits that the acts created. That effect
was caused by the tax's progressive rate structure, the exemption (which
allowed beneficiaries of the property of persons who had modest
fortunes to escape taxation), and the greater likelihood that rich persons
would have life insurance policies that paid substantial proceeds. The
acts' fiscal effect was significant; it was estimated to be $3 million
annually."'
Ten years later, the lines between the advocates of equity and the
advocates of tax benefits for the wealthy were firmly drawn. The
occasion was a bill that was introduced in the 1949 session of the
legislature that would have made it more difficult for a transfer of
property to avoid both the gift tax and the inheritance tax.13 Harold
Groves publicly supported the bill."' Groves was a University of
Wisconsin economist and a nationally recognized authority on public
finance, specifically on tax policy. For years he provided information
and advice to the state government, and during the 1931 session, he was
a valuable Progressive representative to the state assembly.12 For many
decades he had consistently and effectively advocated for tax equity.
126. Act of Aug. 8, 1939, ch. 311, 1939 Wis. Laws 498.
127. Act of July 3, 1939, ch. 204, 1939 Wis. Laws 341.
128. Act of June 21, 1939, ch. 168,1939 Wis. Laws 273.
129. Bill Proxmire, Groves Clashes With Big Business on Integration of Gift, Inheritance
Taxes, CAP. TIMES, May 11, 1949.
130. 1949 A.B. 695 (Wis. 1949).
131. Id.
132. See John 0. Stark, Harold M. Groves and Wisconsin Taxes, Wis. MAG. HIST.,
Spring 1991, at 196-214 (discussing Grove's contributions to society).
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On the other side of that issue was R. 0. Wipperman, a lobbyist for the
Wisconsin Chamber of Commerce, who said, "the men who have known
how to make lots of money are responsible for the greatness of the state
of Wisconsin."'33 Wipperman lifted the veil. Rather than arguing that
reducing tax revenue would increase tax revenue to hide his true
motivation, he bluntly stated his position.
F. Inheritance Tax and Transfers to Spouses
The next phase in the history of the Wisconsin inheritance tax
involved the issue of taxing transfers to spouses. Oddly enough, the
property rights of married women were an issue in the debates about
drafting and ratifying the Wisconsin Constitution. The electors failed to
ratify the constitution's first version, partly because it included a
provision that allowed women to control their property and forbade
seizure of their property for their husbands' debts. The version of the
constitution that the electors ratified in 1848 contained nothing on the
subject of married women's property rights. That issue lay more or less
in abeyance for decades but appeared again in 1971. At that time, a
transfer of joint property at death to the surviving joint tenant was
deemed a transfer of one-half of the property."' That is, only one-half
of the value of the property was taxed. That rule applied to all joint
tenancies, but the surviving tenants in the vast majority of instances
were spouses, and far more husbands predeceased their wives than vice
versa.
1. The Joint Tenant Exception: Requirement of Marital Contribution
In the 1971 session, the legislature rewrote the inheritance tax
laws.'35 Under the new version of the tax, the property that a surviving
joint tenant acquired from the decedent for "full consideration in money
or money's worth" was exempt from the inheritance tax. 36 In other
words, a surviving joint tenant who proved contribution to the marriage
would receive a partial or full exemption. The criterion of providing
money was clear cut, although occasionally difficulties with proof arose.
In contrast, the criterion of money equivalents was vague and thus
became fertile ground for litigation. Interpreted as narrowly as possible,
that phrase meant only consideration in the form of an asset that was
133. Proxmire, supra note 129.
134. WIS. STAT. § 72.01(6) (1969).
135. Act of May 13, 1972, ch. 310, 1971 Wis. Laws 1239.
136. WIS. STAT. § 72.12(6)(b) (1971).
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readily liquidated. However, there were other types of consideration;
most notably, personal services, which have monetary value, albeit of a
form that makes it difficult to calculate. For example, a surviving wife
who had worked alongside her husband in a family enterprise could
argue that her contribution to the enterprise was substantial enough to
qualify her for a complete exemption from the inheritance taxes that
would otherwise be imposed on the transfer to her of the property that
was held in joint tenancy. Resolving that issue would necessitate a
careful analysis of a voluminous body of evidence.
2. Defining "Money's Worth"
Upon enactment of that act, the meaning of "money's worth" was
indeterminate. Into that void stepped the Department of Revenue
("Department").'37 The Department set out to define "money's worth"
for purposes of the inheritance tax. That word appeared in the statutes
as part of one of the two exemptions from the inheritance tax. That
exemption applied to property if "the property or the consideration with
which it was acquired, or any part of either, is shown to have originally
belonged to the survivor and never to have been received or acquired by
him from the decedent for less than adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth." '138 The most difficult and significant part of
the analysis dealt with instances in which the provision of personal
services was alleged to be the "money's worth" that triggered the
exemption. The foregoing hypothetical of the surviving wife who had
worked in a family enterprise alongside her husband was the instance
that needed to be clarified.
The Department asserted:
Generally, personal services of a spouse alone will not constitute
consideration in money's worth. The way in which the spouses
viewed their business relationship as demonstrated through their
Wisconsin income tax returns will be controlling as to how the
equity of the joint property will be viewed at death. The survivor
must meet the burden of proving that either a partnership, a joint
venture, valid leases, payment of salary or anything else
sufficient under Wisconsin income tax law existed between the
spouses."'
137. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, ESTABLISHING CONTRIBUTION IN JOINT
TENANCIES: TECHNICAL INFORMATION MEMORANDUM INH7 (1975).
138. WIS. STAT. § 72.12(6)(b) (1973).
139. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, supra note 137, at 4.
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In other words, for purposes of the exemption, the Department would
recognize the contributions of a person to a marriage relationship, as
those contributions applied to an enterprise, only if the relationship of
husband to wife was not really marital but the relation of a lessor to a
lessee or of an employer to an employee. The anomalous nature of that
assertion, as one would expect, became apparent to others.
Not surprisingly, as a result of its anomalous nature, the rule was
rapidly challenged in litigation.'" In In re Estate of Kersten,4' the bulk of
the estate that was at issue was a farm and farm equipment.1 42 The
Department had declared that there was no exemption, but the widow
asserted that she was entitled to an exemption because she had
contributed to the farming enterprise. Mrs. Kersten had run the
household, helped with various jobs on the farm, kept the books, and
operated the farm alone during two periods when her husband was ill.11
On the other hand, Mr. Kersten had reported all of the income from the
farm as his for state and federal income tax purposes and for social
security purposes.' The Department advanced the same position that it
had presented in its informational memorandum on proving joint
tenancy. 5 It also cited the two cases about proving the existence of a
partnership for Wisconsin income tax purposes that it had cited in its
memorandum.'46
However, the court held that the statute at issue, being very similar
to a federal estate tax provision,14 7 was best illuminated by a federal
case 48 addressing the federal provision.9  Indeed, the facts in Otte
closely resembled those in Kersten. Both cases were brought by widows
who had operated a farm in conjunction with their husbands. In Otte,
the court held that those personal services determined the division of
the transferred property. 5° The Kersten court held the same 5' and
140. In re Estate of Kersten, 71 Wis. 2d 757, 239 N.W.2d 86 (1976).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 758, 239 N.W.2d at 87.
143. Id. at 759, 239 N.W.2d at 88.
144. Id.
145. See generally, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, supra note 137.
146. Id. (citing Stern v. Dep't of Revenue, 63 Wis. 2d 506, 217 N.W.2d 326 (1974); Skaar
v. Dep't of Revenue, 61 Wis. 2d 93,211 N.W.2d 642 (1973)).
147. 26 U.S.C. § 2040.
148. Estate of Everett Otte, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 301 (1972).
149. Kersten, 71 Wis. 2d at 766, 239 N.W.2d at 91.
150. Otte, 31 T.C.M. at 307.
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determined that some real estate that the husband had purchased before
the marriage and some certificates of deposit were fully taxable."2
However, the widow's personal services were a sufficient contribution to
justify exempting half of the remainder of the estate, as joint property,
from the inheritance tax.'53 The court's finding that personal services are
full consideration in money's worth for the survivor's share of the jointly
held property resulted in an exemption of 50% of the property's value. "
In such an instance there was no need to place a monetary value on the
services.'55 The result reached in that case is the same as the one that
would have been reached by reading literally the applicable statute ,156
were it not for its most recent revision, that is, half the value of jointly
held property was exempt.
3. Improving the Disposition of Women Through Legislation
The decision in Kersten was clearly good news for women,
particularly farm wives. However, during the next few years there was
considerable pressure to put widows in an even better situation with
respect to the inheritance tax. An example of such pressure was the
introduction of and enthusiastic support for a bill proposing changes to
the inheritance tax.57 The bill would have exempted 50% of the value
of property held in a joint tenancy, a portion of the property that
reflected the survivor's contribution, or $500,000. 118 An early result of
that pressure was legislation'59 that exempted interspousal transfers from
the gift tax, which was the companion to the inheritance tax.'
6
A few years later, the efforts of women and their supporters to
achieve more favorable inheritance tax treatment bore fruit. In 1981, an
151. Kersten, 71 Wis. 2d at 764, 238 N.W.2d at 90.
152. Id. at 760, 238 N.W.2d at 88. It is not clear from the opinion whether farm proceeds
were used to pay for the certificates of deposit and part of the loan on the real estate. If they
were, one could argue that in calculating the inheritance tax at least some of that property
should have been treated the same as the rest of the estate was treated.
153. Id. at 765, 239 N.W.2d at 91.
154. Id. at 766, 239 N.W.2d at 91.
155. Id.
156. WIS. STAT. § 72.01(6) (1969).
157. Arthur L. Srb, Women Argue for Change in "Discriminatory" Estate Tax Law, CAP.
TIMES, Feb. 26,1976.
158. Id.
159. Act of Apr. 15, 1978, ch. 248, 1977 Wis. Laws 1131.
160. That is, the gift tax existed to prevent escape from the inheritance tax by making
inter vivos gifts.
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act161 created a total exemption for property transferred from one spouse
to the other. 162 By that time, it was becoming clear that the efforts to
liberalize the inheritance tax treatment of transfers between spouses,
particularly to a surviving wife, were part of a larger movement to
increase the property rights of women. The larger movement came to
fruition in the legislative session after the one that granted a complete
exemption for transfers to spouses. That culmination was the enactment
of a marital property act , which created a means of holding property
that was analogous to community property and recognized the
contributions that wives made to marriage. Ironically, the first draft of
the state constitution, which the electorate rejected, contained a far-
sighted provision on married women's property rights.64
IV. THE DEMISE OF THE WISCONSIN INHERITANCE TAX:
DIMINISHING REVENUE
After enactment of the interspousal exemption, the amount of
revenue that the inheritance tax provided to the state had been reduced
dramatically. That reduction made it easier to argue that the tax was
obsolete. In fact, the tax at the time applied to mainly large estates left
by wealthy persons. The proponents of repeal focused on this attribute.
The success of the proponents in obtaining an exemption for surviving
spouses also encouraged those who sought a more radical result: the
repeal of the tax.
One can get a feel for the argument by considering a disagreement
that occurred in 1980, when the pressure to discontinue the tax was
becoming significant. A University of Wisconsin professor and his
colleague argued that a survey that the Wisconsin Center for Public
Policy conducted provided convincing evidence that the inheritance tax
ought to be repealed.' Their principal point was that wealthy, elderly
persons were moving out of Wisconsin to escape the inheritance tax.166
The elderly claimed that the state was losing revenues that they
provided, and therefore, the state would be better off without the tax. 67
161. Act of Dec. 4, 1981, ch. 93, § 141, 1981 Wis. Laws, 773, 794.
162. WIS. STAT. § 72.15(5) (1981).
163. Act of Apr. 4, 1984, Ch. 186, 1983 Wis. Laws 1153.
164. For a discussion of this issue, see ALICE E. SMITH, THE HISTORY OF WISCONSIN
VOLUME 1: FROM EXPLORATION TO STATEHOOD 660-61 (1973).
165. JON G. UDELL & WILLIAM M. BABCOCK, JR., DEATH TAXES IN WISCONSIN
(1980).
166. Id. at 28.
167. Id. at 29.
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Two employees of the legislature attempted to rebut that analysis.""
They pointed out that the persons surveyed had left the state before the
most recent reform of the tax, that the recent reductions made
Wisconsin's inheritance tax similar to other states in its fiscal effect on
taxpayers, that many of the persons surveyed cited better climate as an
important reason why they left the state, and that discontinuing the tax
would cost the state a substantial amount of revenue.169 At that time, the
legislature declined to repeal the inheritance tax.
A few years later, the advocates of repeal made another concerted
effort. An analyst in a state agency published a report that concluded
that Wisconsin's death taxes exacted a larger economic toll than those of
many other states.'7° Some newspapers also called for repeal. For
example, one asserted that the inheritance tax contributed to the state's
reputation as being antibusiness and drove retirees from the state.'7'
Finally, in the budget act for 1987-88, the legislature phased out the tax
over a five-year period.'72
V. CONCLUSION
The inheritance tax, having been repealed, is of only historical
interest. However, its historical interest is significant. In tracing the
history of the tax, one sees its interaction with such important topics as
the degree to which the wealthy should be relieved of taxes and the
proper status of women's property rights. In fact, the inheritance tax is
a reasonably good indicator of the political currents that existed at
various times in Wisconsin's history. Thus, as the history of the
Wisconsin inheritance tax indicates, tax law often is sensitive to political
and cultural changes and is therefore a good guide to those changes.
168. K.S. Kinney, Tax Study Challenged, MILW. J., Oct. 2,1980, at 20.
169. See id.
170. TUN-MEI Y. CHANG, WISCONSIN'S ELDERLY OUTMIGRATION AND WISCONSIN
DEATH TAXES (Wis. Dep't of Health & Soc. Serv. ed., 1987).
171. Time to Eliminate Inheritance Tax, MILW. SENTINEL, June 15, 1985, at 8.
172. Act of July 31, 1987, ch. 27, 1987 Wis. Laws 69, 539.
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